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Abstract
There are persistent tensions of both a technical and political nature between Southeast
Asia’s two major palm oil producers, Indonesia and Malaysia, and the sustainability
governance mechanisms shaping global environmental and trade standards emerging
from Europe. The establishment of the national Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil
(ISPO) certification standard in 2011 is a sign of discontent with the transnational
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) regime, sparking debate about the
legitimacy of private governance models initiated by non-governmental organizations
and companies in Europe. This article questions whether the adoption of sustainability
norms by Indonesia signals normative convergence or the emergence of rival gover-
nance structures that challenge the state. Evidence suggests that elements of norm
adoption and rival governance coexist in Indonesia and that ISPO certification is an
ambiguous policy with degrees of internal incoherence. The ambiguous nature of ISPO
certification gives rise to unresolved disputes over power and authority between various
actors. This article shows how these disputes came into being by framing these
dynamics as part of a long historical process. Novel insights are gained by employing
the state transformation framework and the concept of governance rescaling. Within
this framework, we argue that the ambiguous nature of the ISPO results from complex
interrelated processes of fragmentation, decentralization and the internationalization of
the Indonesian state.
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Introduction
In January 2020 Indonesian President Joko Widodo (hereafter Jokowi) accused the
European Union (EU) of provoking an unjust trade war that discriminates against palm
oil production (Nathalia 2020). In 2020, Indonesia moved to bring the EU’s renewable
energy directive (RED II) to the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DS593), attracting one of the highest rates of third-party participation in
the history of the WTO. Indonesia’s response to EU claims of indirect land use change
and negative externalities caused by palm oil production is often framed as tensions
between developed and developing countries, or the contentious diffusion of global
sustainability norms. We argue that this is only a part of the story.
This article contends that Indonesian state responses to criticisms of the palm oil
industry are complex and nuanced. To illustrate this point, the authors examine
Indonesia’s response to the 2004 Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a
transnational private governance mechanism for sustainable palm oil supported in
principle by many EU-based companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).1
Facing growing international criticism for the social and environmental impacts of palm
oil production, the government of Indonesia established the Indonesian Sustainable
Palm Oil certification standard (hereafter the ISPO) in March 2011.2 As a potential rival
to the RSPO, the ISPO raises questions about the authority and status of previously
established multi-stakeholder voluntary international standards on sustainable palm oil.
Statements from government officials in Indonesia are often ambiguous and do little to
clarify the status of rival sustainability standards. For instance, Achmad Mangga
Barani, the Director General of Plantations in the Ministry of Agriculture at the time,
stated that the ISPO refers to RSPO’s principles and criteria and thus does not rival the
RSPO (Lestari 2010), while the Minister of Agriculture from 2009 to 2014, Suswono,
argued that the ISPO ‘has its own perspective which is different from other countries’
(Zuhri 2011). These statements begin to show that the establishment of the ISPO leads
to conflicting interpretations of how the state-regulated certification scheme interacts
with global and EU-led sustainability norms.
This article offers a comprehensive understanding of the ISPO by drawing upon the
state transformation framework and the concept of governance rescaling. To better
understand the ISPO, we examine the evolution of the Indonesian state and the
development of the palm oil industry in the country, including the competition for
governance rescaling that follows the transformation of the state in the late 1990s that
enabled the establishment of the RSPO and then the ISPO. To elaborate on this central
point, this article proceeds in five parts. Part one looks at the existing debate on the
nature of ISPO and the relationship between RSPO and ISPO to provide the context in
which this article aims to contribute. The second part examines the links between state
transformation frameworks and concepts of governance rescaling to conceptualize the
ISPO in the context of global trade, followed by an explanation of the data collection
methods and evidence. Part three looks at the development of Indonesia’s palm oil
industry, especially in the post-1998 democratic transition and liberalization era. Part
1 There are now RSPO-RED voluntary requirements to improve compliance with the EU Renewable Energy
Directive. See https://rspo.org/certification/rspo-red.
2 The ISPO was established through Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 19/Permentan/OT.140/3/2011.
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four examines the establishment of the RSPO as a response from competing networks
of actors to the rapid expansion of the-* palm oil sector and the continuous tension
within the RSPO. Part five examines the establishment of the ISPO by framing it as part
of the continuous transformation of the Indonesian state. The authors conclude that the
internationalization of the state apparatus leads to the further fragmentation of the
Indonesian state bureaucracy that renders the ISPO an ambiguous and contentious
policy that is ineffective on two fronts: sustainability as well as industry protection.
Research gap: ambiguities of the ISPO-RSPO relationship
There are divergent views on the relationship between the RSPO and the ISPO. By
some measures, the establishment of the ISPO in 2011 indicates the proliferation and
influence of global sustainability norms. EU normative power influences regulatory
standards for global environmental and trade governance in line with renewable energy
targets, though there are forms of institutional and networked opposition from Indone-
sia (Sicurelli 2020; Tyson and Meganingtyas 2020). While acknowledging that the
ISPO has different characteristics from the RSPO, both are viewed as ‘initiatives to
align oil palm production with the principles of sustainable development’ (Ernah et al.
2016). Both are perceived as part of the same trend in global supply chains to
mainstream sustainability norms while transforming the market to create sustainable
products (Hutabarat 2017).
An opposing viewpoint is that the ISPO is a state-driven rival governance mecha-
nism to counter the RSPO. The ISPO appears to show the ambition of the Indonesian
state to reclaim authority from the market-driven RSPO (Giessen et al. 2016), with the
ISPO representing ‘an expression of government sovereignty’ (Astari and Lovett
2019). Indeed, the ISPO may represent an effort by the global South to resist interven-
tions from the North (Hospes 2014; Schouten and Bitzer 2015; Higgins and Richards
2019). In this view, the ISPO is an attempt to reframe sustainable palm oil to enable the
palm oil sector in Indonesia to bypass the RSPO to more effectively access global
markets (Higgins and Richards 2019, 126). In contrast to the RSPO which seeks
legitimacy by relying on external audiences such as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and companies in developed countries who do not themselves implement
standards, the ISPO relies on internal processes of legitimization with national pro-
ducers and trade associations as the focal audience. The establishment of the ISPO is
also a refutation to the claim of a governance void employed by western-influenced
global standard setters such as the RSPO (Schouten and Bitzer 2015).
Given the opposing views on the ISPO, this article argues that both the adoption of
global sustainability norms and the rival governance arguments are partially correct.
This article finds that the ISPO is an ambiguous policy, attempting to restore the
primacy of the national domain of governance and to provide more room for the
domestic palm oil industry while simultaneously internalizing the norms promoted
by transnational private governance. There is a continuous tension within the ISPO
itself, which makes it internally incoherent. This is evidenced by the complex and
uneven responses of the domestic palm oil industry to the certification initiative. For
instance the influential Indonesian Palm Oil Association (GAPKI) urges the govern-
ment to use the ISPO as a diplomatic instrument to overcome trade barriers against the
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commodity (GAPKI 2017). At the same time, GAPKI contends that the stringent
implementation of the ISPO would potentially harm the industry (Supriyanto and
Hidranto 2014). With this ambiguity, the ISPO failed to meet the expectations of both
reformists who want to improve sustainable palm oil governance and protectionists
who want to use the ISPO to protect the palm oil industry from negative media
coverage and trade discrimination.
Studies about the nature of the ISPO and its connection to different public and
private actors in Indonesia and beyond have touched upon these ambiguities directly
and indirectly, although tend not to explicitly identify the ambiguity of the ISPO
(Suharto et al. 2015; Giessen et al. 2016; Hidayat et al. 2018; Nesadurai 2018; Astari
and Lovett 2019; Higgins and Richards 2019). In a study of the nature of the ISPO that
conceptualizes the palm oil regime complex, Pacheco et al. (2020) contend that there
are both complementarities and antagonisms between state regulations such as the
ISPO and international standards such as the RSPO. Pacheco et al. (2020) see that the
palm oil sector is increasingly governed by a transnational regime complex involving
state policies and regulations, market-based mechanisms and self-regulatory initiatives
that interact on different scales, from the global to the subnational. Important comple-
mentarities between state regulations and market-driven initiatives are visible at the
international level, while there are emerging ‘disconnects and antagonisms’ at national
and subnational levels (Pacheco et al. 2020, 582).
A study by Pramudya, Hospes and Termeer (2018, 17) touches upon the ambiguity
of the ISPO, observing that the Indonesian state responses to transnational private
governance efforts such as the RSPO are unstable and changing dynamically. Tracing
the development of the government of Indonesia’s response to the RSPO, including the
establishment of the ISPO, there is a continuous evolution from co-optation by non-
state actors to coordination, from coordination to competition and then from competi-
tion back to coordination again, although in a much more limited manner (Pramudya
et al. 2018, 11). This critical ambiguity is arguably the result of ‘tension between
formulating stricter regulations on the environmental impacts of the expansion of palm
oil plantations and the Indonesian government’s main target of economic expansion of
the sector’ (Hidayat et al. 2018, 234).
Evidence suggests that elements of norm adoption and rival governance coexist in
Indonesia and that ISPO certification is an ambiguous policy with degrees of internal
incoherence. The ambiguous nature of ISPO certification gives rise to unresolved
disputes over power and authority between various actors. This article shows how
these disputes came into being by framing these dynamics as part of a long historical
process. Novel insights are gained by linking the state transformation framework to the
concept of governance rescaling. Within this framework, we argue that the ambiguous
nature of the ISPO results from complex interrelated processes of fragmentation,
decentralization and the internationalization of the Indonesian state.
State transformation and governance rescaling
Concepts of state transformation and governance rescaling explain the ambiguity of
ISPO as the Indonesian state response to transnational private governance. These
approaches help locate and connect the development of the RPSO and the ISPO to
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historical trajectories of Indonesia’s political economy. State transformation frame-
works explain state behaviour by understanding that states are in continuous transfor-
mation, which represent changes in political economy relations within and beyond the
state (Hameiri and Jones 2016; Jones 2019). By seeing the state this way, we under-
stand that some policies are internally incoherent and ambiguous because they are the
temporary results of competition between various social forces. This approach sees
states not as unitary actors and politically neutral problem solving instruments but as
complex and fragmented ‘institutional ensembles that reflect and embed historically
evolving social relations and competition for the distribution of power and resources’
(Hameiri and Jones 2016, 78). In Indonesia, state transformation results in a complex
local-central dynamic which also affects the development of its regional and sub-
regional cooperation projects (Karim 2019).
According to the state transformation framework, governance can be rescaled to new
levels following the evolution of social conflicts because national governance is a
socially and politically constructed historical artefact (Hameiri and Jones 2016, 79).
Different scales of governance privilege different groups, and social forces are contin-
uously struggling to define a scale of governance that most benefits them. The
establishment of the RSPO and then the ISPO can be explained through this lens of
governance rescaling. The RSPO is understood as an effort by global consumer
companies based in the developed world to rescale governance from national to
transnational levels as a way to convince environmentally aware consumers who,
informed by various transnational advocacy groups, distrust the ability of the state in
countries such as Indonesia to ensure sustainability practices in the palm oil sector.
Domestic trade associations and businesses who control the palm oil industry in
Indonesia respond negatively to rescaling efforts because it would mean less privilege
for them to exploit. By framing their interests as the national interest and claiming
sovereignty, the Indonesian palm oil sector is demanding support from the state to
escape the control of the RSPO without losing market share.
Accelerated processes of decentralization, liberalization and state fragmentation in
the post-1998 transitional era increased the entanglement between different parts of the
Indonesian state apparatus and various transnational actors. In this context, some parts
of the state bureaucracy internalized international norms such as sustainability and
sought to reform the palm oil sector. Complex interactions between state bureaucracies
seeking to reclaim their authority, the domestic industry seeking to protect their
business and well-connected NGOs seeking to reform the palm oil sector result in
the ambiguity of the ISPO.
Evidence for this study comes from interviews and observations conducted period-
ically in Indonesia from 2015 to 2020, crosschecked with a wide range of written
sources including statements, in-house publications, minutes of meetings, press releases
and position papers from the RSPO, the ISPO, palm oil companies, trade associations
such as GAPKI and the palm oil growers’ association (APKASINDO), government
sources such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Office of the President, as well as civil society actors. The
authors analysed selective Indonesian news coverage of the palm oil industry from
2009 to 2020, mainly from sources such as Bisnis Indonesia, Kompas and Republika
that focus on economic issues and have a wide national readership. The year 2009
marks the establishment of the first iteration of the EU’s renewable energy directive
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(RED I) and the start of a new era of export risk and contract cancellations. These
written sources provide the plot and storyline to be connected and framed through
theories of state transformation and governance rescaling.
The authors conducted in-depth interviews during different stages of fieldwork in
Indonesia (Jakarta, Riau, Bandung, Surabaya) and the UK from 2015 to 2020. Inter-
viewees were purposively chosen based on their expert knowledge of the palm oil
industry and agribusiness in Indonesia, especially on the evolution of the RSPO and the
ISPO. Semi-structured anonymized interviews were conducted so that participants
could express their opinions freely. To obtain a comprehensive picture, the authors
sampled elite informants as well as farming communities in Riau, Indonesia’s main
palm oil producing province (Apresian et al. 2020).
Not all statements from interviewees are quoted directly in this article, but the
cumulative insights we have gained over time guide the construction of the argument
in this article. The next section elaborates on the dynamic processes of state transfor-
mation and governance rescaling (and counter-rescaling) in the Indonesian palm oil
sector. To make it easier to follow, the storyline is presented in a semi-chronological
manner.
Key developments in the palm oil industry
While industry actors often proclaim that palm oil is ‘a gift from God for Indonesia’
(Supriyono 2016), the original habitat of the oil palm tree is in West Africa (Berger and
Martin 2000, 397). It was the Dutch who first brought oil palm trees to the Bogor
Botanical Gardens in Buitenzorg in 1848. The use of palm oil for industrial purposes
began in the mid-nineteenth century in Central Java (Larson 1996), and the first
commercial oil palm plantation was established in 1911 (PASPI 2014). The colonial
Dutch East Indies quickly became one of the major global producers of palm oil. By
1937 it was the world’s largest exporter of crude palm oil (CPO), producing around
40% of total global exports according to the Palm Oil Agribusiness Strategic Policy
Institute (PASPI 2014, 11). The complexity of post-colonial state-building after 1945,
and President Sukarno’s nationalist economic policies that discouraged foreign invest-
ment and exports, led to the decline of palm oil production. In 1958 CPO exports fell to
17% of global market share (PASPI 2014, 11).
In the aftermath of a national political crisis and regime change in 1966, the
authoritarian developmental New Order regime led by President Suharto revitalized
the palm oil industry. Government estates that produced palm oil expanded from
84,000 ha in 1969 to 343,000 ha in 1987 due to direct government investment through
the Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan state owned plantations (Larson 1996; PASPI
2014). The growth of the palm oil industry in Indonesia was supported by the World
Bank, which saw palm oil as an instrument for rural development and potential export
commodity. In the late 1980s, the industry was gradually liberalized with the introduc-
tion of the People’s Nucleus Estate (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat, PIR) model. Under the
PIR model, the government facilitated more participation from the private sector by for
instance awarding logging rights and concessionary rate credits, with the requirement
that estates create partnerships with smallholders in their proximity (Larson 1996).
These policies resulted in the growth of the industry, as the total plantation area reached
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3.9 million ha by the late 1990s. Indonesia’s CPO production rose from a mere 188,000
t in 1969 to 6.4 million t in 1999 (PASPI 2014).
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis heralded a political crisis that precipitated the fall of
President Suharto in May 1998 and the IMF-led restructuring of Indonesia’s political
and economic system. Institutional reforms that included liberalization and the further
opening of the economy provided a boost for the palm oil industry (Sato 2003). Three
main factors explain the emergence of Indonesia as the largest producer of palm oil in
the world, overtaking Malaysia in 2006. The first factor is the opening up of the palm
oil sector to foreign investment, which led to the mobilization of capital from regional
players in Malaysia and Singapore. The Letter of Intent signed by the IMF and
Indonesia on 15 January 1998 encouraged foreign investment. Accordingly, the gov-
ernment decided in June 1998 to issue a revised and shortened negative list of activities
closed to foreign investors. As part of this process, the government removed restrictions
on foreign investment in palm oil plantations in February 1998, while those on
wholesale and retail trade were lifted in March 1998 (IMF 1998). The easing of
restrictions on foreign investment in the palm oil sector provided incentives for
companies in Malaysia and Singapore, which have abundant capital but limited land,
to invest in Indonesia and increase production by controlling more plantation areas in
Indonesia.
The second factor explaining the palm oil production boom is Indonesia’s political
and administrative transformation. The promulgation of Law No. 22/1999 on Regional
Government transferred many authorities from central to local governments, including
the authority to issue plantation permits for palm oil. The third factor is global
economic trends such as the rise of China and India that increased demand for palm
oil (Ewing 2011). Following the flow of capital from Malaysia and Singapore to
Indonesia, the increasing global demand was mostly met by CPO produced in
Indonesia. Key indicators of governance rescaling such as liberalization and the
opening of the palm oil sector to foreign investment mean further transformation
from a developmental to a regulatory state that aims for global competitiveness. It
also means the further transfer of authority from state to market mechanisms. Complex
governance rescaling results in decentralization and fragmentation. As Resosudarmo
(2005) notes, decentralization and the reluctance of central government to fully imple-
ment reforms causes vertical conflicts between different levels of government, as well
as horizontal conflicts between local governments and power competition between
government agencies. This is particularly evident in the palm oil sector, which has
become a site of contestation between various social, political and economic forces.
Indonesia’s rapidly growing palm oil sector in the 2000s is strongly connected to
state transformation. Fragmented authorities within the Indonesian state, marked by
overlapping policies and regulations between central and local governments and among
government agencies, has paradoxically created a conducive environment for growth.
The expansion and regionalization of the industry has been driven by patronage politics
(Varkkey 2012), which operates under a system of multilevel (mis)governance (Ham-
ilton-Hart 2015). The 1999 decentralization policy shifted the authority to issue palm
oil plantation permits to local governments, leading to a rise in the number of plantation
permits in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Irregular spatial planning led to overlapping
regulations and jurisdictions, resulting in permits being issued without proper proce-
dures. Palm oil expansion has been strongly connected to corruption linked to
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campaign finance, and in the heavily cultivated province of Riau, three former gover-
nors have been jailed for corruption. Annas Maamun, the Governor of Riau from 2014,
could not complete his term because he was caught by the Corruption Eradication
Commission in a bribery case. He is guilty of accepting bribes to convert the land status
of some oil palm plantations in Kuantan Singingi, Rokan Hilir and Bengkalis districts
from forest to non-forest zones to legitimize production (Dipa 2015).
The factors enabling the rapid growth of the industry also inhibit the mechanisms to
control its adverse effects (Hamilton-Hart 2015, 179). Responding to this situation,
communities, often supported by local and international NGOs, engage in collective
mobilization and criticize the business practices of palm oil companies. In Kalimantan,
for example, rural women in Sambas mobilized against palm oil company PT SAM to
defend their land (Morgan 2017). Protests against palm oil companies in Indonesia are
documented in the 2018 film Asimetris directed by Dandhy Laksono and produced by
WatchDoc.3 These key developments in the palm oil industry are precursors to the
establishment of the RSPO and the ISPO, as examined in the next sections.
The RSPO and the transition to sustainable palm oil
Forms of EU normative power are evident in the search for cleaner production and
sustainable sourcing of palm oil. International NGOs often target the consumers of
global brands that use palm oil as their materials, especially in Europe. The focus on
consumer awareness in developed countries seems to be driven by surveys consistently
showing that people in the EU and elsewhere value the environment and biodiversity.
For instance, the European Commission conducted several Eurobarometer surveys on
biodiversity (Flash Eurobarometer 2007; 2010; 2013; Special Eurobarometer 2015).
The data consistently shows that most Europeans think that biodiversity loss is a
serious issue and that they will be personally affected. The Eurobarometer Survey on
the Attitudes of European Citizens towards the Environment found that the environ-
ment ‘has an indisputable importance in the lives of Europeans’, as 96% of respondents
feel that protecting the environment is important for them personally (Special
Eurobarometer 2008).
To mobilize consumers in developed countries, NGOs use various ‘naming and
shaming’ campaigns. The use of opprobrium is designed to influence palm oil
production by disrupting the end of the supply chain. The expectation is that
market mechanisms will force producers to limit the harm done to the environ-
ment. For instance, in the early 2000s, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) ran a
lipstick from the Rainforest awareness campaign, followed shortly after by a
Greenpeace campaign to hold the palm oil industry to account. A 2007
Greenpeace report entitled How the Palm Oil Industry is Cooking the Planet
claims that the palm oil industry is the main contributor to deforestation in
Indonesia, with 1.8 billion t of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions being released
annually. The report accuses global companies that source palm oil from Indone-
sia such as Unilever, Nestlé and Procter & Gamble of being complicit with
environmental crimes (Greenpeace 2007). Unilever and its suppliers have been
3 The film Asimetris is available for public view at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OhaxAalJdk.
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labelled ‘destroyers’ of forests and peatlands in Indonesia (Greenpeace 2008),
while Nestlé, another major user of palm oil, is said to benefit from the burning of
tropical forests and the loss of orangutan habitat (Greenpeace 2010).
As consumer awareness about the environmental impacts of the palm oil industry
rises in developed countries, so does the pressure placed on global brands which use
palm oil in their products. In May 2008, Unilever responded to pressure by declaring its
commitment to clean up the company’s supply chain (Unilever 2008). In December
2009, the company cancelled a US$ 30 million contract with Golden Agri-Resources
Limited (GAR) in Indonesia because of unsustainable practices (Gray 2011). In
March 2010 Kraft, another major global brand followed suit (Adnan 2010). In the
same year, the global fast food chain Burger King halted their cooperation with the
Indonesian palm oil company (Kompas 2010). Unilever now has a 100% sustainably
sourced palm oil pledge and has developed new geolocation monitoring technologies to
improve supply chain transparency, whereas Sime Darby has a new open access
Crosscheck 2.0 online traceability tool to support its goals of a deforestation-free
supply chain.
Intensive NGO campaigns and market pressures create a dilemma for producers and
the companies that use palm oil in their products. Companies need a steady supply of
CPO for their business. Replacing palm oil with rapeseed or soybean oil produced in
Europe is challenging because palm oil is generally a more cost-effective and high
yielding flex-crop. The question for companies is how to convince conscientious
consumers to buy their products while maintaining a steady supply of palm oil. In this
context, transnational actors such as international NGOs and multinational companies
based in developed countries, especially in Europe, agreed to initiate the Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).
Transnational private governance in the form of the RSPO has emerged as a
significant benchmark for standards of sustainable palm oil, setting out key
principles and criteria and developing a system for trade in certified sustainable
palm oil (Hai 2013, 22). The number and composition of members, as well as
the market impact of certified products to the supply chain, are important parts
of the RSPO’s legitimacy, although this rests on an uneasy consensus between
antagonistic groups with different interests and concerns, and the power
asymmetries within the RSPO may erode its legitimacy. While the secretariat
of the RSPO is in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, the RSPO is largely
dominated by companies and NGOs based in Europe. The apparent domination
of actors from developed countries continues to challenge the legitimacy of the
RSPO, whose standards and best practices are benchmarked against those set by
the UK-based ISEAL Alliance. Indonesian Palm Oil Association (GAPKI)
officials often complain about the influence of developed countries that comes
at the expense of producer countries. During a 2014 interview in Jakarta, an
official from GAPKI suggested that ‘the fact that the RSPO was established in
Switzerland shows who they are’. The composition of RSPO membership
underrepresents producer countries. As of November 2020, from a total of
4941 members (including ordinary, affiliate and associate members), only 190
are palm oil producers. Neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are in the top ten
countries ranked by RSPO membership (RSPO 2019a), creating some distrust
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towards the RSPO.4 For instance, GAPKI formally withdrew from the RSPO in
September 2011.
The dominant role of Western NGOs and downstream actors in the palm oil supply
chain in the RSPO is evident in the standards-making process. The RSPO works by
establishing a standard for sustainable palm oil and creating a system to ensure
compliance. As a roundtable, the standard conceptually should come from all the
members. While formally this is true as all members have a voice in the process, the
standard itself is set by developed countries. The proposed sustainability standard and
adaptation strategy that were discussed in the preparatory meetings for the establish-
ment of the RSPO in September 2002 in London were shaped by previous initiatives in
Europe. In 1998 for instance, Unilever started to develop the indicators for sustainable
palm oil, while in 2000 Migros, with the help of the WWF and Proforest, created
supply chain standards that would form most of the RSPO’s principles (Nikoloyuk
et al. 2010, 62).
Since 2004 the roundtable has been a site of contention between social forces with
different interests and concerns. While both NGOs and companies in the northern
hemisphere aim for governance rescaling through the RSPO, they have different
priorities. NGOs strive for governance rescaling to mitigate the negative environmental
and social impacts of the palm oil industry’s unsustainable practices. They advocate
stricter principles and enforcement criteria for sustainability standards. Companies on
the other hand need to balance their ledgers. They must keep their consumers satisfied
while at the same time ensuring that the supply of affordable palm oil is not disrupted.
For NGOs the goal is stricter sustainability criteria and a stronger rules-based system
of enforcement. This prompted the formation of the Compensation Task Force in 2011,
which is generally seen by producers as changing the voluntary nature of the RSPO.
NGOs such as the WWF insisted on bringing the draft of the guidance for compensa-
tion to the RSPO Executive Board in July 2013 despite objections from some palm oil
producers. As a response, some RSPO members protested and walked out of the
Executive Board meeting (RSPO 2013). NGOs within the RSPO continue to insist
that the RSPO is not doing enough, echoing the criticisms from non-member NGOs
operating outside of the RSPO. Greenpeace, for example, harshly criticized the RSPO
as ‘certifying destruction’ (Greenpeace 2013). NGO members continue to argue that
the RSPO is at risk of growing weaker. The Dutch-based NGO Aidenvironment, an
RSPO member, threatened to withdraw after the RSPO revoked its suspension of the
IOI Corporation for illegal forest clearance and planting on peatlands in West Kali-
mantan, Indonesia (Chow 2016). Aidenvironment decided to remain in the RSPO only
when the IOI Corporation agreed to abandon 434 ha of ‘overplanted’ areas (Chin
2016), a small but apparently effective compromise. A Swiss NGO called PanEco to
quit the RSPO in 2016, citing the ‘sheer level of inaction’ against the breach of RSPO
principles by PT Sisirau, a company accused of destroying orangutan habitat. PanEco
also criticized a new RSPO resolution that members should ‘promote and not denigrate’
certified sustainable palm oil despite its clear flaws (Jacobson 2016). This shows that
NGOs both insider and outside the RSPO remain highly critical of the RSPO as a form
of transnational private governance.
4 As of December 2020, the top ten RSPO countries by membership are the USA, Germany, the UK, Italy, the
Netherlands, Japan, France, China, Belgium and Spain.
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Companies at the downstream end of the palm oil supply chain, mostly based in
developed countries, are also facing uncertainties. There are some true reformers within
the industry seeking to change the way business in the palm oil sector is conducted.
However, critics suspect that companies join the RSPO to enhance their brand image
and reputation. Even Unilever, often hailed as the world’s leading champion of
sustainability, is criticized for not being fully committed to sourcing identity preserved
palm oil from genuinely sustainable plantations. Despite the company’s claims from its
marketing division that it sourced all of its palm oil sustainably since 2012, critics
pointed out that in 2015 only 19% of the palm oil actually came from RSPO-certified
plantations (Dupont-Nivet et al. 2017). In response, Unilever published its 2016
Sustainable Palm Oil Sourcing Policy that commits the company to 100% physically
certified palm oil and its derivatives (Unilever 2016). The case of Unilever illustrates
that companies can use the RSPO as a branding platform to boost their markets despite
ongoing uncertainty about sustainable practices in their supply chain.
Criticisms of downstream companies are not only coming from NGOs. Producers
accuse downstream companies of being unduly influenced by networks of NGOs while
at the same time being unwilling to share the burdens of sustainability. While growers
are forced to fulfil RSPO principles and criteria to produce certified sustainable palm
oil, downstream companies push producers to certify their palm oil and raise standards
but do not actually purchase large quantities of certified sustainable palm oil. In 2018,
for example, from a total supply of 13,287,565 metric tons of certified CPO, less than
half was actually sold (RSPO 2019b). As a Bloomberg report aptly puts it, the world
has an abundance of sustainable palm oil, ‘but no one wants it’ (Raghu 2019). Some
producers complain of the hypocrisy of downstream companies that cooperate with
NGOs to make the certification process stricter, and thus more complicated and costly,
out of concern for their brand image, while proving unwilling to pay a premium for the
certified product.
Palm oil producers inside and outside the RSPO, especially those based in Indone-
sia, often accuse NGOs of not having genuine concerns about the environment and the
negative social impacts of the palm oil industry. Some contend that the NGOs are part
of a trade war designed to decrease the competitiveness of palm oil (Choiruzzad 2019).
With the one member one vote system, producers feel that the RSPO is tilted to the
interest of international NGOs and downstream companies. This perception led to the
withdrawal of GAPKI from the RSPO, although many Indonesian companies that are
also GAPKI members remain in the RSPO to secure their market (Merdeka 2011).
Complex responses to the RSPO reflect concerns about the legitimacy of private
governance models initiated by non-governmental organizations and companies in
Europe. The 2011 establishment of the national Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil
(ISPO) certification standard is a manifestation of the discontent with the RSPO among
some producers and government bodies.
The ISPO as a counter-rescaling strategy
GAPKI’s withdrawal from the RSPO in 2011 coincides with the establishment of the
ISPO by the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, despite being presented as
compatible with the RSPO, many observers see the ISPO as a rival governance
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mechanism (Hospes 2014). This view seems consistent with the previous attitudes of
Indonesian government officials regarding the palm oil controversy. When the palm oil
boom in the 2000s resulted in criticisms from domestic and international NGOs as well
as international actors such as the EU, the standard response has been to defend the
industry. Budiono, the Vice President of Indonesia from 2009 to 2014, frequently
stressed the importance of palm oil in Indonesia’s development (Muhada and Hernanda
2010). According to Bayu Krisnamurthi, who served as Deputy Minister of Agriculture
from 2009 to 2011 and Deputy Minister of Trade from 2011 to 2014, producers of
rapeseed, sunflower and soybean oils cannot compete with the yield efficiencies of
palm oil and thus resort to smear campaigns and protectionism (Lestari 2009). Similar
statements are frequently made by high-profile government officials in Indonesia.
The strategic position of palm oil in Indonesia’s economy forces NGOs to brand
their actions as being against deforestation rather than in opposition to palm oil. On
occasion NGOs even frame their criticisms as an effort to maintain the positive image
of Indonesia’s palm oil industry. Bustar Maitar, the then Leader of Greenpeace’s
Indonesia Forest Campaign in 2010, acknowledged the importance of this commodity
in Indonesia’s economy. He stressed that the Greenpeace campaign is ‘aimed at
stopping deforestation and the destruction of peatlands. We demand the government
of Indonesia to be firm against major companies that destroy the forests before they
further destroy the image of Indonesia’s palm oil’ (Lestari and Sihotang 2010).
However, relations between NGOs and the government, especially the Ministry of
Agriculture, remain lukewarm. ‘We are open to criticisms, as long as the criticism is
valid. It is not valid if one death of an elephant becomes the basis for accusation against
all palm oil plantations. NGOs must be objective’, according to Achmad Mangga
Barani, the then Director General of Plantations in the Ministry of Agriculture in
2010 (Lestari and Sihotang 2010). The palm oil industry, which is closely aligned with
the Ministry of Agriculture, musters everything in its power to strike back against anti-
industry campaigns led by NGOs and activists. It appears that one of the reasons for the
enactment of Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organizations was the imposition of
stronger restrictions on international NGOs operating in Indonesia, especially those
criticizing the palm oil industry such as Greenpeace.
The strategically important palm oil industry tends to unite state actors, though the
state does not function in unison. Fragmentation within the state leads to the emergence
of different policy networks operating in different parts of the state bureaucracy. In this
context, not all government units automatically side with the palm oil industry. The
Presidential Unit (UKP4) during President Yudhoyono’s two terms in office (2004 to
2014) was a powerful agency that pushed for reform in the industry and worked closely
with domestic and international NGOs. A similar role, but with a different approach, is
played by the Presidential Staff Office (KSP) under the current President Joko Widodo.
While the Yudhoyono-era UKP4 approached sustainable palm oil production mostly in
the context of international norms to protect the environment, and thus engaged in
various international schemes such as reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (the REDD project), the Widodo-era KSP focuses more on land conflicts
and agrarian reform.
The UKP4 is the agency responsible for the issuance of Presidential Instruction No.
10/2011 on the moratorium on forest conversion, a regulation that was heavily criti-
cized by the palm oil industry. Despite this backlash, the moratorium was extended by
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President Yudhoyono in 2013 and retained under President Joko Widodo’s adminis-
tration. UKP4 members intervened in the sector by revising some Ministry of Agri-
culture regulations, particularly those relating to the issuance of plantation permits
(Zuhri 2012). This intervention by government officials antagonized the industry as
well as officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, although they never aired their
grievances publicly. One interviewee from the palm oil industry stated in 2014 that
the UKP4 is an example of how foreign interests can intervene in state affairs through
the oversized influence of NGOs. As special agencies under the President, the UKP4
and the KSP are often staffed by practitioners and activists with strong ties to domestic
and international NGOs.
Mutually reinforcing factors of state transformation such as fragmentation and the
internationalization of the state apparatus were seen in Yudhoyono’s environmental
diplomacy. Indonesia’s high-profile environmental diplomacy was on display at the
2015 Paris climate conference when the country became one of the first developing
countries to pledge to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 26%. Indonesia’s voluntary
national contribution is incongruent with the realities of unsustainable practices on the
ground and ever-growing palm oil production targets (Taufik 2016). The contradiction
between global pledges and grounded realities illustrates the competition of various
social forces to control the domain of national governance. Reformists within the
government, many working for the UKP4 (and now the KSP), appear to endorse
international norms and commitments.
Through various policy commitments, reformist officials seek to mobilize interna-
tional resources to support reform initiatives in the forestry sector. Examples include
the Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (AU$ 70 million pledged), the German-
sponsored emission reduction (REDD) pilot project (EUR 32.4 million), the UN-
REDD initiative (US$ 5.6 million), the Korea-sponsored project for the adaptation
and mitigation of climate change in forestry (KIPCCF, US$ 5 million) and Australia’s
agricultural research fund (ACIAR, US$ 1.4 million) (Muhada and Hernanda 2010).
The influence of international funding on the reform of Indonesia’s forestry sector is
apparent in the redefinition of the classification of forests following the signing of the
Letter of Intent between Indonesia and Norway, in which Norway promised a US$ 1
billion grant for forest conservation (Muhada and Hernanda 2010). National and local
resistance is also powerful, however, rendering various policies designed for reform in
the forestry sector problematic (Taufik 2016).
Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of palm oil, though the country relies on a
relatively inefficient model of expansion rather than land-saving forms of intensifica-
tion to meet production targets (Varkkey et al. 2018). The pressure for reform from the
government, usually from officials with strong international connections, coupled with
campaigns by domestic and international NGOs against the palm oil industry, has
reduced the opportunity for expansion. The industry resents this development and
argues that it decreases the competitiveness of Indonesia’s palm oil production. For
instance, Donald Siahaan, a senior researcher in the Palm Oil Research Centre, the
industry’s leading commercial research institute, argues that if Indonesia is ‘too focused
on responding to environmental issues, other countries will take our market’ (Nurul
2010). The RSPO is perceived negatively in this context because it demands stricter
sustainability criteria and less flexible implementation, potentially hindering growth in
the palm oil industry. Companies are cautious because withdrawing from the RSPO
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could damage their business. Consequently, many Indonesian palm oil companies
retain their RSPO membership while simultaneously delegitimizing the RSPO. For
instance, companies ask the government to protect them against negative campaigns
from NGOs that are portrayed as an instrument of the trade war by rival vegetable oil
producers from Europe and elsewhere (Choiruzzad 2019).
Conflicting pressures for reform and protection result in the establishment of
ambiguous policies such as the ISPO. For reformers, the ISPO provides the opportunity
to establish better national governance and management of the palm oil industry. For
the industry, the ISPO provides an opportunity to resist the RSPO by delegitimizing it
through the presence of a rival scale of governance and certification standard. The ISPO
gives industry players more flexibility to expand production. Despite the recent issu-
ance Presidential Regulation No. 44/2020 on Indonesia’s Sustainable Palm Oil Planta-
tion System, there is still no mechanism for independent observers. Furthermore,
sensitive issues such as human rights and labour rights remain excluded or only
integrated minimally in the ISPO mechanism (Arumingtyas 2020). Having strong
networks with national politicians and policymakers, the domestic palm oil industry
feels it is advantageous if the governance of the industry remains within the national
domain.
The ambiguous nature of the ISPO is illustrated by Suswono, the Minister of
Agriculture from 2009 to 2014, when he explained the importance of the ISPO to the
palm oil industry. The former minister said that the ISPO ‘is established not to create
difficulties for the industry, but to refute environmental-based negative campaigns. The
ISPO does not judge one-sidedly. However, all industry players must follow the ISPO’
(Zuhri 2011). While excluding important RSPO concepts such as high conservation
value, the ISPO adopts many RSPO principles and criteria, to the extent that there is an
ongoing proposal to develop a combined audit mechanism (Suharto et al. 2015). This
may simply represent mimicry without any real commitment to implementation, though
some reformers within the state see the ISPO as an opportunity to achieve better
governance in the sector.
In terms of implementation, the protectionist camp is more prevalent than the
reformist camp within Indonesia. It is not surprising that NGOs are sceptical about
the ISPO. According to Bustar Maitar, at the time was with Greenpeace Southeast Asia,
the intention of the ISPO has always been unclear. He asks whether the ISPO is ‘a
serious initiative to develop the palm oil plantation sector without deforestation, or only
a gimmick to resist negative campaigns against palm oil’ (Lestari and Hernanda 2010).
Companies have their own complaints against the ISPO, arguing that the implementa-
tion of the ISPO as a mandatory obligation in 2014 harms the palm oil industry,
especially smallholders who account for considerable growth and expansion in the
sector. The government lacks the bureaucratic capacity to conduct sustainability as-
sessments, for instance, having limited numbers of certified ISPO auditors. For these
reasons, GAPKI demanded that the government postpone the implementation of
mandatory ISPO rules in December 2014 (Supriyanto and Hidranto 2014). The
government has shown leniency towards the industry. As of 2019, it is estimated that
only 4.1 million ha (29.3%) of a nationwide palm oil plantation area measuring 14.03
million ha have been ISPO certified (Anggraini 2019).
Government agencies supported by industry are more aggressive in their use of the
ISPO as an instrument to protect the palm oil industry from the perceived trade war
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with the EU. GAPKI pressures the government to use ISPO standards as a diplomatic
instrument to ‘prove’ that Indonesia’s palm oil industry is already sustainable and to
refute the accusations and trade barriers against the commodity (GAPKI 2017).5 In
2020, this demand was legally accommodated and institutionalized, with the declared
aim of ‘increasing the acceptance and competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil products
in national and international markets’ included in Presidential Regulation No. 44/2020
on the ISPO system. Despite the efforts of the Indonesian government to promote the
ISPO to the international community, it is still not fully accepted by the market. For
instance, Vincent Guerend, Ambassador of the European Union to Indonesia and
Brunei Darussalam from 2015 to 2019, stated that the ‘ISPO, being implemented only
by 15% of Indonesia’s palm oil producers, is not considered as a global standard’
(Murdaningsih 2018). If the ISPO is seen as a watered-down version of the RSPO, then
it is unlikely to be taken seriously as a robust standard for certified sustainable palm oil.
Under Joko Widodo’s presidency since 2014, the ambiguity of the ISPO persists.
The government is taking measures to strengthen implementation, and yet there are
concerns about the commitment and the real motivation of these efforts to strengthen
the ISPO. Most recently, in March 2020, the government sought to strengthen ISPO
implementation through Presidential Regulation No. 44/2020. Previously, under the
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 11/2015, palm oil certification was mandatory
for all plantation companies except those producing palm oil for renewable energy and
voluntary for plasma or independent smallholders. Under the new regulation in
March 2020, all plantation estates and smallholders in the palm oil sector must have
ISPO certification. For companies, this mandatory certification requirement took force
with immediate effect in March 2020. For smallholders, the government allows up to 5
years for a transition period before ISPO compliance will be enforced. Under the ISPO
rules, smallholders are eligible for financial support from national and subnational
government to help achieve this transition.
While many NGOs laud this development as a marker of progress in the governance
of the palm oil sector, they also demand that the development of new ISPO standards
and criteria have more involvement from civil society to ensure that the ISPO is
effective in its sustainable business goals. The March 2020 Presidential Regulation
includes a specific chapter on how to promote the ISPO to increase its acceptance in
international and domestic markets. As part of a complex sustainability agenda, there
are signs that the ISPO certification standard is being used to rival the RSPO and to
support Indonesian claims of EU discrimination in the vegetable oil trade war (Nathalia
2020; Tyson and Meganingtyas 2020). President Joko Widodo has made palm oil
diplomacy a key plank of his foreign policy platform (Choiruzzad 2019), for instance,
putting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of diplomacy, promotion and advo-
cacy of Indonesian palm oil.
The ambiguity surrounding the ISPO is apparent in the broader context of palm oil
governance in Indonesia. For instance, JokoWidodo issued Presidential Instruction No.
5 Similar developments can be observed under the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) scheme. The
MSPO was launched as a voluntary government-regulated scheme in 2014 and became mandatory in 2017.
With strong industry backing, Malaysian government agencies have pushed for, and received, recognition of
the MSPO in other major export markets, for instance, from the Tokyo 2020 Olympics and Paralympics
Games Sustainable Sourcing Code Committee, China’s Green Food Development Centre, and the Solvent
Extractors’ Association of India, as a form of pushback against developments in the EU.
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5/2019 on the Moratorium of Granting New Permits and Improving Governance of
Primary Natural Forests and Peatlands. This regulation turned a temporary moratorium
of forest conversion subject to extension every 2 years into a permanent rule. In 2020,
amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the government passed a controversial omnibus law
on job creation that experts and civil society organization warn will lead to less public
scrutiny, undermining sustainability targets (Greenpeace 2020; Mashabi 2020). This
situation lends strength to the argument that the ambiguity of the ISPO is a conse-
quence of the meta-phenomenon of Indonesian state transformation in the age of
globalization.
Conclusion
There are persistent technical and political tensions between Southeast Asia’s two
major palm oil producers, Indonesia and Malaysia, and the EU directorates and lobbies
shaping global environmental and trade standards. This article finds that Indonesia’s
fractured responses to transnational private governance in the agricultural sector are
connected to continuous processes of state transformation. In the case of palm oil
production, the creation of the ISPO certification standard in 2011 is linked to
competition among opposing social forces in the context of the internationalization
and fragmentation of the Indonesian state. Domestic capital involved in the palm oil
industry attempts to counter governance rescaling by transnational actors (mainly
companies and NGOs based in developed countries), manifested in the 2004 Round-
table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), in order to sustain their perceived privilege in
the national scale of governance. Indonesian trade associations and industry players
exploit their connections with relevant government agencies such as the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade. At the same time, reformists within the state
bureaucracy internalize global norms of sustainability and attempt to push reforms in
the governance of the palm oil industry. This jockeying for power and influence
resulted in the establishment the ISPO, an ambiguous policy that internalizes RSPO
standards and mimics global and EU norms while simultaneously creating a rival form
of governance to protect the palm oil industry from external pressures.
The inherent ambiguity of the ISPO causes practical dilemmas on two fronts. The
ISPO is generally ineffective in its implementation, to the disappointment of reformists
within the Indonesian state, and at the same time is unable to serve as a legitimate
alternative to the RSPO in the global market, to the disappointment of protectionists.
The low level of acceptance of the ISPO by international markets explains why
Indonesian palm oil companies tend to remain in the RSPO despite their criticisms of
membership, representation and the interventionist nature of transnational private
governance.
Active campaigning by industry players with close political connections has elevat-
ed palm oil to the status of a strategic priority in Indonesian foreign policy. In October
2019, for instance, during her first speech as Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Retno
Marsudi specifically mentioned palm oil as a diplomatic priority. The foreign minister
contends that palm oil is a strategic national commodity and the growth of the sector ‘is
a fundamental matter because it is related to the livelihoods of more than 16 million
people, especially small-scale farmers and their families’ (CNN Indonesia 2019). The
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authors anticipate that the jostling between transnational and national domains of
governance will continue to intensify, and the evolving power dynamic will be shaped
by simultaneous and overlapping competition between social forces that are advocating
palm oil policies at different scales of governance.
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